INTRODUCTION
Digital Rights Management (DRM) is a popular approach to achieve security required in digital content distribution systems. Under DRM protection, digital content is usually encrypted before distributed. To strengthen security, the implementation of the encryption algorithms needs to be modified, so that the algorithms are unintelligible to adversaries. Some methods, such as code obfuscation [1] and white-box cryptography [2] [3] [4] [5] , have been proposed to undertake such modifications. These methods ultimately aim to keep the decryption key secret, so that only authorized users can access protected content. In addition, traitor tracing schemes [6, 7] have also been implemented to trace nasty users that redistribute the content illegally.
Focusing on the security aspect, however, DRM systems often neglect users' privacy. The systems usually collect users' data to allocate appropriate usage rights. This data acquisition is also useful to view users' buying patterns. The provider may use the data for marketing purposes without users' permission. This situation increasingly invades users' privacy and, thus, reduces users' satisfaction. Therefore, DRM systems need to provide balanced protection for content providers' security and users' privacy [8] .
A typical DRM for content distribution consists of four parties: content provider, distributor, clearing house and consumer (user) [9] . First of all, the content provider delivers encrypted content to the distributor and corresponding usage rules to the clearinghouse. The distributor makes the protected content available on a web server that enables users to download it. A consumer then retrieves the content through the distribution channel and requests a license from the clearinghouse. Downloading content from the distributor's web does not seriously threaten the content provider's security neither the users' privacy. While the users can download content anonymously, they cannot unlock the content, unless having the proper decryption key. In contrast, acquiring a license from the clearinghouse creates a concern over security and privacy. If an eavesdropper steals the license when a user requests it from the clearinghouse, revenue will be lost, and thus threaten the provider's security. Moreover, personal information submitted by a user to the clearinghouse is not guaranteed to be kept secret, thus potentially threat the user's privacy.
To overcome the problem, we construct a content distribution protocol by utilizing the oblivious transfer concept. Oblivious Transfer (OT) is a cryptographic protocol that allows two parties to privately exchange one or more secret messages. An OT protocol has to be set up in such a way that it will achieve security for the sender and privacy for the receiver [10] . The former means that the receiver will not be able to learn more than he was supposed to learn. The latter means that the sender will not know what the receiver has learned. The first OT protocol, introduced by Rabin [11] , was intended to overcome the exchange of secrets (EOS) problem. This protocol enables a sender to deliver a message to a receiver in such a way that the receiver can access the message with probability and the sender will not know whether the message was received. Rabin's protocol was then generalized to the [12] . In the protocol, the sender has two secret messages and the receiver wishes to learn one of them. This scheme has been studied extensively and generalized to a wide variety of models including [13] [14] [15] and [16, 17] . The security of the OT protocols has been intensively studied [18] [19] [20] [21] . The OT protocols are also aimed at overcoming the restriction in the availability of the secret message.
II. THE PROPOSED PROTOCOL AND IMPLEMENTATION
To provide a solution for the identified DRM problem, we undertake four stages: (1) constructing an oblivious content distribution protocol; (2) implementing the protocol to improve the DRM model for content distribution; (3) analyzing the security and privacy aspects of the improved DRM; and (4) extending the protocol to cover more variables.
A. Oblivious Content Distribution Protocol
Our oblivious content distribution protocol, described in our previous paper [22] , utilizes tamper-proof devices. A tamper-proof device means any device that can be used only in a particular way, otherwise the device will be corrupted and its content will no longer be accessible. Utilizing tamper-proof devices in this protocol is less expensive. The device contains only two types of functions, GetKey and GetContent. GetKey function allows the user to ask for the key; that is, the input parameter to the GetContent function. GetContent, on the other hand, requires an authorized key to reveal the message stored in it. With this characteristic, the device can be mass produced at a low cost. Creating a single device containing all pairs of functions (GetKey,GetContent) may be reasonable and more efficient. However, for the sake of clarity in this sub section, we assume that one device contains a pair of functions (GetKey,GetContent).
The protocol allows content provider to deliver contents to user in such a way that at the end of the protocol the user cannot access contents more than he is supposed to access and the content provider will not know which contents are accessed by the user. Suppose the content provider (say, Alice) provides N contents (e.g. movies), (M 1 , ..., M N ), and the user (say, Bob) wishes to access K, where K < N, of these contents. Alice has a secret code S to access the contents, and utilizes Shamir's secret sharing scheme [23] , with the threshold parameter N-K, to share the secret. That is, she splits the secret into N pieces such that any set of at least N-K shares can reconstruct the secret.
The detail protocol is as follows. To share the secret and send the contents, Alice performs the following steps:
1. She secretly chooses random 4. She gives all devices to Bob.
After delivering the devices there is no subsequent communication between Alice and Bob. Bob can access K Figure 1 . Process for obtaining K out of N contents contents if he accepts sacrificing N-K contents that are not supposed to be accessed. This condition is applied with assumption that once a device is executed, it will be corrupted or will destroy itself. To obtain K contents, Bob performs the following steps (see also Figure 1 for a clear illustration 
B. Implementation to Improve DRM
To implement the constructed protocol in the DRM applications, we employ smart cards. A smart card contains an embedded microprocessor so that it can be used not only to store data, but also to process the data [24] . The microprocessor is also used for security purposes. Data are never directly available to the external applications as the microprocessor controls data handling and memory access according to a given set of conditions. Suppose the content provider provides N contents, M 1 , ..., M N . First of all, the content provider encrypts all contents using a secret key S. For a particular value K, , S is split into N shares, s 1 ,…,s N , using Shamir's scheme with the threshold parameter N -K. The content provider then passes the protected contents to the distributor and the key's shares to the smart card (SC) manufacturer.
The SC manufacturer creates smart cards and sends them to the distributor. The smart card model (see Figure 2) has the following characteristics. That is, executing the function GetKey(s i ) will disable the associated function GetContent(M i ) and, thus, will deny access to the associated content M i . Conversely, executing the function GetContent(M i ) will disable GetKey(s i ).
In concrete terms, the smart card executes N-K
GetKey functions associated with N-K unselected contents. The shares revealed by these functions are then combined to construct the key S that be used to unlock K selected contents A user can download the protected contents from the distributor's channel and purchases an appropriate smart card. To access the downloaded contents, the user's player must be connected to a compatible smart card reader. A K-valued smart card can be used to unlock K selected contents and denies access to N-K unselected contents.
C. Security and Privacy Analysis
The improved DRM model for content distribution provides an efficient mechanism. Instead of a clearing house, the system employs a smart card manufacturer. Users obtain the content and the corresponding license (provided by an appropriate smart card) from one party, that is, the distributor. This mechanism makes the process more efficient. Furthermore, the improved system also achieves security and privacy for the content provider and the users, respectively. An analysis of both characteristics follows.
Assuming that the smart card is a tamper-proof device, the proposed oblivious content distribution protocol achieves perfect security for the content provider. In the proposed protocol, the shares of the secret key and the function for accessing content are stored in tamper-proof devices. The user cannot access content without obtaining the secret key. The key, however, is split into several pieces of shares and distributed among the pairs of functions (GetKey,GetContent) inside the device, using Shamir's secret sharing scheme [23] . This scheme is secure because knowing less than a predetermined number of shares gives the user no way to reconstruct the secret. As a result, the user can only obtain the secret key if (and only if) he sacrifices all contents that he is not supposed to access. This means that the user is not able to access anything other than the contents that are supposed to be accessed. Additionally, the smart card is only allocated to the user who has made the payment for it. A particular smart card allows the user to access a limited number of contents as determined in it. Therefore, the proposed protocol achieves perfect security for the content provider.
By the same assumption, the proposed oblivious content distribution protocol preserves high privacy for the users. In the proposed protocol, there is no interaction between content provider and user after the content provider gives all devices to the user. There is no way for the content provider to determine which devices the user has used. As all pairs of functions (GetKey,GetContent) are corrupted at the end of the protocol, the content provider has no knowledge about which content that has been accessed by the user. Additionally, in the protocol implementation, to unlock the content, a user does not need to provide his personal data for the license. Instead, he purchases the corresponding smart card anonymously. The content and its associated smart card will not be connected to the user's identity. Therefore, the user's privacy is protected.
III. EXTENDED PROTOCOL
In the basic protocol described previously, a user can decrypt a set of contents no more than he was supposed to access. However, once the content has been decrypted, the user can play it without limit. If the restriction of the number of plays is also considered in a business scheme, then an extra variable must be added to the content distribution protocol.
This section describes how the proposed protocol can be enlarged to cover more variables of the usage rules. That is, how we can combine the variable number_of_items and number_of_plays in one scheme. Generally, suppose content provider has N items and a user purchases K items and L plays. An extended smart card utilized to fulfill this need is called -smart card. In the -smart card model, we place pairs of functions (GetKey(s i,j ),GetContent(M i,j )) in a matrix. For a particular j and , all s i,j and M i,j associate with the key share s j and the item M j , respectively. The extended smart card (see Figure 3 ) has following characteristics: a. As the previous model, only one function can be executed from each pair. b. The secret decryption key S can be obtained by executing some GetKey functions at the first play (i.e at the first row of the matrix). Once S is reconstructed, it can be used to decrypt other selected items at subsequent plays. c. Executing GetKey(s 1,j ) functions will disable associated GetContent(M i,j ) functions for all , and thus, unable user to access item M j in all plays.
. This means that for each play user can only access one item.
To access K items and L plays, Bob has to perform the following protocol. functions, for The characteristics of -smart card and the protocol it performs guarantee that the user can play all K items, but no more than L times overall. This advanced scenario provides a flexible content distribution system that still preserves security and privacy.
Bob determines

IV. CONCLUSION
The oblivious content distribution protocol developed in this research provides balanced protection for the content provider and the users in a content distribution system. To strengthen security of the distributed content, the decryption key is split into a number of shares. Decrypting the protected content requires adequate shares to reconstruct the key. It means that a user can only access content that he has paid for. On the other hand, utilizing tamper-proof devices in the protocol guarantees that the users' privacy is protected.
The proposed protocol can also be enlarged to cover more variables. Despite providing flexibility, the system still preserves security and privacy. The implementation of the protocol can potentially improved DRM to be a privacy-aware rights protection system -providing balanced achievement on content provider's security and users' privacy.
